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ETHINT 27 - ( ) 29 Nov 45


AN INTERVIEW WITH
Genmaj (W-SS) Fritz KRAEMER

THE SIEGFRIED LINE
(12-16 SEP 44)


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HISTORICAL DIVISION
SPECIAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



12 July 1949



Note to: ETHINT 27

By: Kenneth W. Hechler
Major, Infantry (Res)



See the annotation on ETHINT 23 for an explanation of the general circumstances surrounding the oral interviews with German PWs at Chateau Hennemont, St. Germain, France.




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ETHINT 27 - ( )



Title: The Siegfried Line (12-16 Sep 44)

Source: Genmaj (W-SS) Kraemer, Fritz

Position: C of S, Sixth Pz Army

Date: 29 Nov 45

Place: Unknown (probably St. Germain, France)

Interviewer: Capt Frank C. Mahin

Circumstances:

This interview was facilitated by the presence of Dr. Percy Schramm, Historian, Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operations Staff, OKW), who not only served as translator, but added significantly from his knowledge of this operation.




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Foreword




This interview is one of a series conducted by the Historical Section, ETOUSA, and its successors. Unfortunately, only a typed record in English is available for editing. It is not known whether a record in German was made at the time of the interview nor, if one was made, can the accuracy of the translation be determined. Therefore, no absolute guarantee can be given as to the authenticity and completeness of this version of the interview. Only obvious errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammatical construction have been corrected. All parenthetical statements, except those of the editor, which are identified as such, are as they appear in the available record.




ROBERT W. FYE
1st Lt, FA
Historical Editor
Mar 29 1948



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ETHINT 27

1. Q: Is this map (our enemy situation map) correct?

A: Not quite. Actually, 1 SS Pz Div and 12 SS Pz Div were only kampfgruppes, both under control of the 2 SS Pz Div staff. The 2 Pz Div was almost intact. This designation (172 Tng Div) is misleading. In this case, there existed only a staff for the special purpose of supervising the civilian labor working to recondition the Siegfried Line. These civilians had been operating under political leaders, who were titled "Defense Commissioners," but who, of course, lacked technical and tactical knowledge. The 172 Staff was present to coordinate and advise the civilian workers. Therefore, that symbol is misleading, because it denotes the presence of troops when none were there.


2. Q: When did you feel the Siegfried Line in your zone could be held?

A: Seven or eight days after we arrived. By that time, some artillery had been moved up and we felt the Line could withstand your attacks. Of course, you realize that to us the West Wall was largely a bluff. It was outmoded, unarmed (Ed: Actually, the West Wall was at least partially armed with automatic weapons and artillery.), and poorly maintained; however, we recognized that it had three advantages. It gave us a physical installation to which we could tie in our defense and stabilize the front; it lent some protection from your artillery and mortars; and, perhaps most important, it placed a psychological burden on your troops. In my zone, we felt we could contain you, prior to the attack on Wallendorf (14 Sep 44).


3. Q: Did the demonstration of 5 Armd Div (US) near Wallendorf on 12 and 13 Sep 44 (attack on 14 Sep 44) cause you to shift any troops from the north to meet this threat?

A: No, we did not consider it necessary to place more than our small reserve there. I knew you were concentrating near the Schnee-Eifel, and I felt there was sufficient strength near Wallendorf. On the ring of hills around Wallendorf, I had placed enough artillery to take care of an attack in this area.


4. Q: What was the reaction to our attack at Wallendorf?

A: It came as a great shock to the High Command, because there were no reserves readily available. The attack was astride not only a corps boundary (I SS Pz and LXXX Inf Corps) but also an army boundary (Seventh Army and Fifth Pz Army). As always in war, the junction of these different units was not very strong. You were successful at first, but when you slowed down in the "saucer," our artillery had some "good shooting." At this time, 19 Volks Gren Div came into the area, and 106 Pz Brig became available. A kampfgruppe from Pz Lehr Div in LXXX Inf Corps was dispatched towards the bridgehead. All these troops and two battalions of infantry from 2 SS Pz Div counterattacked your forces and pushed them back across the river. I saw 106 Pz Brig afterward and do not believe it lost more than about ten tanks.


5. Q: If we had committed, initially, the entire Armored Division, plus one regiment of infantry, instead of one combat command, do you believe we could have gone as far as, say, Pruem and Poonsfeld (Ed: probably Pronsfeld)?

A: No, not as long as the weather stayed bad. If, however, you had had even one more division to advance on Bitburg, I believe you could have made it to the Rhine. There was nothing to stop you.

6. Q: What form did you expect our attack in the north to take?


A: I expected a pincers like this (Interviewer's Note: With his fingers, Kraemer indicated a pinch-off of the Schnee-Eifel, precisely the reciprocal maneuver of their attack on the Ridge on 16-17 Dec 44.). Your pincers movement--Schnee-Eifel and Wallendorf--was too wide to be successful.

7. Q: Were the troops in the Schnee-Eifel reinforced when our intentions were disclosed?

A: No, not other than by the normal reinforcement that was being effected all along the line as troops were brought up from Germany. We used a pattern of deployment that was originated in the other war (Ed: World War I?), when we alternated Prussian and Austrian troops in adjacent sectors; the Prussians were the "ribs of the corset." This time we interspersed SS and panzer troops between the miscellaneous troops that arrived from Germany.


8. Q: After we had made a breach on the Schnee-Eifel, we attempted to move east off the Ridge. The leading battalion was ambushed and suffered heavily. Do you remember which unit sprang this trap?

A: It was a regiment from 2 SS Pz Div. It had, in addition, two 210mm mortars, and the following day one tank arrived. This tank knocked out six or eight American tanks.

9. Q: Farther south near Hassenfeld, a kampfgruppe from 2 SS Pz Div launched a night attack on 15 Sep 44, which put one of our battalions in substantial difficulty. We had reports of flame throwers mounted on half-tracks. Was this done?


A: Yes, the attack was made by approximately five companies with two flame-throwing half-tracks. These were improvisations. We found that your troops were not as well trained in night operations as in daylight fighting. We also found, even back in Normandy, that we could count on a three hour lull about noontime. Both your ground and air forces were habitually quiet during this time, and we used the period to bring up supplies, move troops, etc.

10. Q: Shifting now up to the Monschau area, on 13 Dec 44, we made an attack aimed at the Roer and Urft River dams. One thrust was north of Monschau, at Lammersdorf, the other south of Monschau, above Rocherath. Did these attacks alter your plans or dispositions for your imminent offensive?


A: No.

12. Q: Who ordered the commitment of 106 Pz Brig and 19 Volks Gren Div?

A: A Gp B put both units at the disposition of LXXX Inf Corps, to our south. That Corps gave the specific orders for the attack.

ETHINT 53 - ( ) 24 Nov 45



AN INTERVIEW WITH
Genmaj Rudolf Frhr von GERSDORFF


DEFENSE OF THE SIEGFRIED LINE




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ETHINT 53 -( )



Title: Defense of the Siegfried Line

Source: Genmaj von Gersdorff, Rudolf Christoph, Frhr

Position: C of S, Seventh Army

Date: 24 Nov 45

Place: Unknown (probably St Germain, near Paris

Interviewers: Capt Normal B. Sigband
Capt Fred L. Hadsel
Capt Frank C. Mahin




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Foreword



This interview is one of a series conducted by the Historical Section, ETOUSA, and its successors. Unfortunately, only a typed record in English is available for editing. It is not known whether a record in German was made at the time of the interview, nor, if one was made, can the accuracy of the translation be determined. It will be detected from some of the answers given that questions other than those contained in this record were asked. For the information contained therein, they have been retained. For these reasons, no absolute guarantee can be given as to the authenticity and completeness of this version of the interview. Only obvious errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammatical construction have been corrected. All parenthetical statements, except those of the editor, which are identified as such, are as they appear in the available record.




LE ROY S. STANLEY
CAPT, INF
Historical Editor
Apr 29 1948


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ETHINT 53

1. Q: Were the boundaries between the German units in the Siegfried Line designated before you reached the Line in your retreat?

A: Yes.

2. Q: What were the exact plans made for the defense of the Siegfried Line?

A: We knew the Line was outmoded and unarmed, but were ordered to hold it at all costs; there were no organized plans to hold the line. We were just ordered to defend it in a "fight and die" manner. The pillboxes were to be used as protection from artillery and bombing and the bunkers as rifle and light automatic-weapon firing pits. The new model heavy guns (Interviewer's Note: MG 42) could not be fired from the pillboxes as some of them were too big for the slits and the men could not stand the smoke and the concussion caused by firing them. While some of the troops were to fight outside the pillboxes, the pillboxes themselves were to be defended to the last man. The line actually was a hindrance as it prevented us from choosing where we would fight, and tied us down to precarious positions.


3. Q: How were the retreating divisions organized?

A: The German Home Army, although very small, was defending the Line initially. As the troops retreating across France reached the Line, they were thrown into its defense without rest or reorganization. What was called the cream of the German Army, that is, the SS and Luftwaffe troops, was withdrawn from the Line first. One of these units withdrawn was a flak corps. While these units were taken to the rear for reorganization and rest, the poor infantry were thrown into the fight as they arrived.


As the staffs of the armies, corps, and divisions were intact and already in the area, the troops withdrawing from France were rounded up on their arrival and assigned to the unit in whose zone they were at the moment. There were all types of troops in the Line, plus a lot of quickly recruited men who had no training at all--such as policemen, Lufwaffe fortress battalions, and the home guard. The underground communications within the Line, installed at the time of its construction, were functioning.


The LXXXI Inf Corps, at this time, was in Aachen.

The security organization which defended the Line before the retreating troops arrived, consisted of one division plus one regiment (total force in the Line was approximately 8000 of which 6000 were of the division). These troops, plus some artillery, defended the entire Seventh army front.

The sight of the Luftwaffe and SS troops retreating to the Line first, with the commanders leading the retreat, was very bad for morale. They simply got into their vehicles and took off. There was a riot in Aachen about it.


The political leader of the Party in Aachen had ordered all civilians to leave the city, and stated that those who failed to do so were traitors; however, the Commander of 116 Pz Div, Genlt Graf von Schwerin, countermanded the order (Ed: See ETHINT 18). When Hitler heard of this he was going to try von Schwerin for treason. "Sepp" Dietrich interposed at this point and the trial was dropped. The propaganda against the General Staff (Ed: probably Generalstab, General Staff Corps) for this act was terrific.


4. Q: When did 12 Inf Div come to Aachen?

A: On 12-13 Sep 44. They were attached on LXXXI Inf Corps specifically to strengthen the Aachen area. LXXXI Inf Corps at this time consisted of 49 Inf Div, 116 Pz Div, remnants of 9 Pz Div, and 105 Art Brig. The LXXIV Inf Corps, commanded by Gen Straube, consisted of 89 and 347 Inf Divs.

The corps, north to south, were LXXXI Inf Corps, LXXIV Inf Corps, and I SS Pz Corps.

5. Q: What was the mission of 12 Inf Div?


A: To carry out the stupid tactics of our great leader, that is, to "stay and die." This was an order.

The 12 Inf Div was to stop the breakthrough of the first (outer) line. By the time the Division came up, however, the Americans were through the first wall, and the Division was then ordered to stop the attack on the second line. This could not be done; it was impossible.

The troops which defended Wallendorf consisted of Kfgr Hausser, 106 Pz Brig, and 19 Volks Gren Div (with MK V tanks). The 19 Volks Gren Div was not brought down from Denmark to stop the American drive. It just happened to be there when it was needed.



The Wallendorf and Lammersdorf battles were not make in conjunction with each other. It was just by chance that they took place at the same time. Other than this, there were no attempts of any kind, either by attacks or counterattacks, to aid the defense of Aachen.

The German High Command did not think they could stop them before the Rhine River because of : (1) the lack of organization, training, armor, and well-trained officers and non-commissioned officers, (2) the low morale of the troops, and (3) inability of the luftwaffe to stop the American Air Force. I told my Commander that this was the time to surrender and that to continue the War any longer was a crime against the civilian population (this was early Sep 44).


It was a surprise to me when I was told in Oct 44 of the plans for the Ardennes Offensive.

At the end of Sep 44, I felt we could hold the Siegfried Line. (Interviewer's Note: When asked for a more precise date, Gersdorff said that after 12 Inf Div was committed on 17 Sep 44, he knew he could hold the enemy.)

6. Q: Did you know how serious our supply problem was?
A: Not at the time. It wasn't until you had cleared up your supply problem that I learned about it from a captured American officer.


7. Q: Did you think the Americans would spread out for the drive through the Line, or that we would concentrate on a narrow front?

A: I thought you would concentrate on a narrow front, probably at Aachen as the terrain there was best for attack.

8. Q: Don't you think a concentrated, narrow drive would have left our flanks dangerously exposed?

A: If you had known about our weakness in the Line, you would not have worried about your flanks.


9. Q: What would have been the outcome of our breakthrough, assuming that it could have been accomplished by 20 Sep 44?

A: There was nothing between that point and the Rhine except a few scattered troops.

10. Q: During the period 7-17 Sep 44, how accurate was your intelligence of our movements?

A: Very good. We had many agents in your lines and both civilians and these agents kept us informed. Especially valuable were our foresters, who were very familiar with the woods and could move undetected. Yes, our intelligence was good and we knew of your movements.


11. Q: Did you intend to defend the Meuse River line?

A: Yes. We intended to defend every place we could.

12. Q: When did the High Command decide to defend west of the Rhine?

A: That was not our decision. We were ordered to do so by Hitler. We were not in a position to make an independent decision.

13. Q: When did Fifth Pz Army come to the German north flank?

A: I think it was on 16 Nov 44.


14. Q: Why was command of the area given to Fifth Pz Army?

A: There were already a number of tank units in the area, and it was considered wise to leave the command to tank experts. The sector was very large and this, in effect, would reduce it in size.

15. Q: Did any new units come to the Schnee-Eifel?

A: I don't know. I suggest you see Gen Kraemer (Ed: C of S, Sixth Pz Army).

16. Q: Why was the Huertgen Forest defended so strongly?


A: We fought to protect the Roer River Dams. It was a delaying action aimed at preventing a breakthrough to the river line and a sweep north up the [Cologne] plain. It was easier to defend in the woods than in the open because your tanks could not operate.

17. Q: When did the Roer Dams become important as defense?

A: They have always been important to defense, but I do not think they were built for that purpose. They are a double-edged sword.


18. Q: Would you have flooded the Roer River had we threatened the Dams too much?

A: No. We would not have flooded the River, because we had too many of our own troops west of it at the time. Later, of course, when our troops had been withdrawn to the east bank, we did flood it. We were afraid your air force would damage the locks to the extent that we might not be able to prevent the river from flooding. We did open one of the dams, and the River rose considerably; however, we had to keep it in check for our own good.


19. Q: Which do you think are the best for forest fighting, tree bursts or ground bursts?

A: Tree bursts. Your mortars were very good in the forests.

20. Q: Can you estimate the number of German casualties in the Huertgen Forest?

A: No, but they were very heavy. A lot of them were from frost bite and trench foot (Ed: See ETHINT 60).

21. Q: Was the movement of 89 Inf Div in response to our attack?


A: No, the division had been ordered east of the Roer River some time earlier, in preparation for the Ardennes Offensive, and it just happened to be there. It was only by chance that it was near Schmidt.

22. Q: Who ordered the commitment of 116 Pz Div?

A: The 116 Pz Div was ordered to Schmidt by the A Gp B Commander, Genfldm Model. The attack on Schmidt through the Huertgen Forest prevented our units engaged there from being rested or refitted for the Offensive. These divisions were: 3 FS Div, 89 Inf Div, 116 Pz Div, and 275 and 277 Volks Gren Divs. That was probably the most successful aspect of your campaign in the Huertgen Forest.


23. Q: Did you think the Americans would bypass the Huertgen Forest?

A: No. There was no use in the Americans going through the Huertgen Forest, as it was easy to see it would be hard to take and easy to defend. Had you gone around it on both sides, you would have had almost no opposition. We did not have enough troops in the area at the time. Also, had you bypassed the area, we could not have launched a big counterattack there--not with the army of 1944. (Ed: From his answer, von Gersdorff apparently understood the question to ask whether he thought the Americans would attack through the Huertgen Forest.)


24. Q: We noticed that even as late as Dec 44, we received identifications of various kampfgruppes. Did you intentionally maintain certain kampfgruppes as such, or did you consolidate all of them into divisional organizations?

A: We made them all into regiments and divisions. We initially kept the kampfgruppe nomenclature so that someone back in Berlin couldn't look at a map and say, "Well, you already have so many divisions...," and thus expect us to do more than we were capable of doing.