Chapter 12. METAPHYSICS

Table of Contents

The (scholastic) terminology of metaphysics

The (scholastic) terminology of metaphysics

Substance consists of two attibutes: cogitation (res cogitans) and extension. It is infinite and indeterminate. Understanding and motion are the properties of these attributes, which means that motion always is a proportion of motion and rest. Particular things are modifications or accidents of the two attributes. KV distinguishes between essential , existentialand causal production and explicates this by the terms creation and generation.

SUBSTANCE

Related concepts: denking, uitgebreidheid; wijze.

Zelfstandigheid most times occurs in syntagmas with 'geen, alle, de eene, de andere, bepaalde, eindige, twee gelijke, ieder' etc, that are logically inconsistent with Spinoza's philosophy, but functional in his way of reasoning. In the dialogues the use of zelfstandigheid instead attribute is conceded (denkende, uitgebreide zelfstandigheid; cf.069Z) and the adjective 'zelfstandig' only occurs in the notes (zelfstandige denking, zelfstandige uitgebreidheid). The appendix (409sqq.) repeats the argument in a concise way.

NATURE

Related concepts: wezen; God; zelfstandigheid.

In ordinary (biblical) use 'natuur' and 'aard' are synonyms for objective characteristics. But with the 'aard van de zaak' KV adds the concept esssence to it (wezen; cf.028, 151). And soo the technical content of 'natuur' in general becomes God (036); i.e. the formal essence of nature (039) and not nature itself. The chapter (133sqq.) in which this nature in general is distinguished in natura naturans and natura naturata completely derives from 1,29s. In this light it is remarkable that the Spinozistic formula 'deus sive natura' (Natuur of God) is used exclusively in the appendix; in 317 the editor replaces nature in the text by God in the margin. Epistemologically nothing exists of which the attribute of thinking does not have the idea of its formal essence (352, 415). In the appendix 'door haar natuur' means by definition (per definitionem) and nature is interpreted in a rationalistic, strictly logical way.

FORCE

Related concepts: voortbrengen, afhangen

'Macht/kracht' or the ability to determine is the quantitative dimension of causality. God being allmighty in traditional theology, thus is presented as the all-determining force in Spinozist philosophy. The political dimension of this doctrine is not realised in the KV yet, but implied by 200: as far as man is part of this devine power, he is not subjected to this changeable world. In this respect might and perfection equate each other (225; cf.072), so that knowledge of the less perfect can be estinguished by the kwowing of what is more perfect (342sqq.). In some contexts kracht* and macht* function as non-tehnical terms (e.g.007, 082Z, 257).

ATTRIBUTE

Related concepts: zelfstandigheid.

'Eigenschap' is used both for the infinite properties of God and the two Cartesian attributes (120) but also in accordance with ordinary language use.

EXTENSION

Related concepts: denking.

MOTION AND REST

Related concepts: uitgebreidheid.

Motion and rest (17x) enables a quantitative conception (144sqq.) of any modification (434) of the attribute of extension (cf.1,32c2; 134, 337). The editor of the notes and the appendix prefers 'beweging en stilte' above the expression 'beweging en rust'. The 17th century contemporary physical term roeringe in de stof (Stevin: stofroersel) is used for motion and rest in the context of Burgerdijck's causes only (092; cf.135: Natuur-weet is also a Burgersdijck term). The doctrine of motion and rest in Spinoza both relates to Cartesius' esprits animaux and Hobbes' doctrine of motion (338sqq.).

ACCIDENT

Related concepts: dadelijk (appendix only: 402sqq); wijze.

Toeval(lig) is the regular translation of accidens (Meyer: accidentalis). The use of 'door zichzelf' as a technical term for (causa) per se is not always claer and only evident in 091 and 120n. KV generally does not use it as an antonym of per accidens, but of per aliud (2xE). What is per se, is selfevident (265) epistemologically. In 401 where 'toeval' translates modificatio, Aristotelico-Scholasticism interferes with Spiniozism.

MODE

Related concepts: zelfstandigheid; toeval.

The use of wijze, wijzing as technical terms for modificatio is not consistent. Wijze sometimes interferes with the the regular signification of 'way, manner' (280) and with the attributes of which the particular things are the modifications (133). The epistemologic consequences of this doctrine are treated 152sqq. 'Toeval' is used as an alternative translation of modificatio (401). The appendix consequently uses 'wijzing' (25x) whereas 'wijze' dominates elsewhere in the KV: 'wijzing' only occurs twice there. The use of 'wezen' in 126 and 191 seems due to copiist's error.

ESSENCE

Related concepts: doening.

The term 'wezentlijkheid' (existence) is used for the actual being of an essence (wezentheid, wezen; 028). In God essence and existence presuppose each other (044, 272, 415). Essences come into being by modification of one or both attributes (086, 130, 202, 306). Each essence is perfect in its kind and the most perfect being consists of all the essences (061). This perfection makes God give being to all essences with absolute necessity (104, 117). The quality of the knowledge of an object depends on the perfection or (divine) essence contained in that specific object (269, 371). Knowing is a passion (280), but it becomes more active relating to the degree of perfection in the known object (387sqq.). Both the Scholastic terms essence and existence perfectly fit the need of means to express the subtleties of Spinozisme. This explains why they are relatively more frequent in notes and appendix and why some forms of these concepts even are specific for just these parts of the KV. Besides as a synonym of essence the term 'wezen' (ens) is used for any being in general (005, 046).

FORMAL

Related concepts: idee, voorwerp.

'Vormelijk' is used the way PPI derived it from Aristoteles' e?d??, as it seems preferably in technical sense in notes and appendix: the form of an object is its idea in the thinking attribute.

SUBJECT

Subject is the Scholastic Neo-Aristotelic translation of ?p??e?µe???. KV also uses the puristic (grammatical) term 'onderwerp' (Kók: subjectum=onderwerp). Subject only occurs in the notes wheras 'onderwerp' in technical sense only occurs in the appendix. The editor of the notes probably is not the author of the appendix.

OBJECT

Related concepts: idee, vorm.

The use of 'voorwerpelijk' (objective) in the appendix (9x) and the beginning of KV shows remarkable similarities. Elsewhere 'voorwerpelijk' does not occur. The term 'voorwerp' (object) is a more philosophically marked synonym of thing or something but not a technical term.

THING

Related concepts: denking, denkende zaak, natuur van de zaak.

Except for natuur vande zaak (essence) and denkende zaak (res cogitans) only non-technical use as 'something, nothing specific' occurs.

PARTICULAR

Related concepts: deel, geheel.

Spinoza's theory about the notiones communes is presupposed in 115 and 139 (cf.Mg401: TTP84,23-26; 61,31; 253,1-8): God did not create general ideas, but only particular things. Particular things therefore are the only object of adequate knowledge (116, 144). The form 'bijzonderheid' only occurs in the appendix.

MATTER

Related concepts: uitbreiding.

Matter (Kók: materia=stof) is used sometimes as a non technical term for extension.

ATTRIBUTE

Ascribe (toedichten) and apply (toepassen) are used for establishing as a property with more or less reason and do not concern the attributes.

IMPULSE

Cartesian term for quantity of movement (Ep30 I 472).

IMMEDIATE

Juridical term: "immediate van dezelfde kamer gehouden"; Meyer: immediatelijk: immediately;

CREATE

Related concepts: voortbrengen, wezen, natuur.

'Scheppen' and 'genereren' both function in a Christian or biblical context. The text provides them with a Spinozist content. The distinction between 'scheppen' and 'genereren' (028) is used in Judeo-arabic philosophy to make a conceptual distinction between essence and existence. In spite of PPIax10 and CMII,10, Spinoza explicitly denies perpetual creation (274). Willem Blyenbergh thus seems to have acquaintance with the doctine of 430 when he writes: "dat God niet alleen de zelfstandigheden, maar ook de bewegingen in de zelfstandigheden heeft geschapen" (Ep155). For 038 see 1,17cs.